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In modern economic science the transactional 
theory of the firm as a part of the new institutional 
economics has become a leading approach in 
explaining the reasons of a firm’s existence and 
development. Its formation and development is one 
of the most important advances in the economic 
theory of the XX century. The starting point of 
both the transactional theory of the firm and the 
new institutional economics is considered to be 
Coase’s famous paper "The Nature of the Firm" 
published in 1937. During the XX century the 
transactional theory of the firm took significant 
steps in its development and became one of 
the most important parts of modern economic 
mainstream.
It is important to note that all theoretical 
approaches to the nature of firms seek to answer 
fundamental questions first formulated by Coase 
(Coase, 1937):
1. The existence: why do firms exist? Why 
aren’t all the exchanges in the economy 
done through the market mechanism?
2. Boundaries: What determines the 
boundaries of a firm?
3. Organization: Why do firms have such a 
structure? How do formal and informal 
structures interact?
Parallel development of various theories of 
the firm is to a large extent explained by their 
different approaches to the concept of “a firm” 
– 1399 –
Sergei N. Levin and Dmitrii V. Kislitsyn. Business Groups: Challenge for the Transactional Theory of the Firm
and various research objects. As Tambovtsev 
stated “various theories of the firm highlight 
... different aspects, elements and interactions 
between them, build various models of the firm 
that results in non-identity of objects of these 
theories” (Tambovtsev, 2010).
In the framework of different theoretical 
approaches a firm can be represented as:
• a production unit – the neoclassical 
approach;
• a decision making process – the behavioral 
theory of the firm;
• a contract decision – the transactional 
approach.
In the framework of the neoclassical 
approach a firm is understood as a production 
unit supplying the market with products and 
services. It is described as having a production 
function and perceived as a “black box” that 
transforms inputs into products and services. In 
contrast to neoclassical economics, organization 
theorists seek to explain the processes in a firm, 
as well as its relationships with the environment. 
From the perspective of this approach (the 
behavioral theory of the firm) the coordination of 
individual units and individuals is a key function 
of a firm. Effective coordination is not automatic; 
it is determined by the executives’ decisions 
which determine an organization’s structure, 
control mechanisms, incentives, goals and 
members. Therefore, the study of how managers 
make decisions is crucial for the analysis of an 
organization and its actual behavior (Table 1).
Simon, a classic of the organization 
theory, identified an organization as “a pattern 
of communications and relations in a group 
of human beings, including the processes of 
making and implementing decisions” (Simon, 
1997). Cyert and March describe an organization 
as “a decision-making process” (Cyert and 
March, 1992). Scholars have noticed that profit 
maximization is not the most important goal 
that drives managers’ decisions as it is implied 
by the neoclassical theory of the firm. Managers 
are guided by conflicting goals and have bounded 
rationality.
Both neoclassical and behavioral theories 
of the firm have a significant influence on the 
economic theory development, but the dominant 
position is currently held by the transactional 
approach.
According to the transactional theory a 
firm is regarded as an extreme single grading 
scale of coordination mechanisms that differ 
Table 1. Theoretical approaches to the concept of “a firm”
Theory  
of the firm
Definition Role Scope Performance
Neoclassical Production function Supply of products and 
services
Technology Production costs and 
market power
Behavioral Decision-making 
process leading to 
action
Coordination of 
specialized units through 
information processing
Rationally 
bounded decisions 
of management 
coalitions
Effectiveness of 
internal structure 
to deal with the 
environment 
Contracting Nexus of contracts Governance structure of 
transactions (vs. markets)
Transaction costs Total costs, 
especially 
transaction and 
agency costs
Source: Becerra, M. Theory of the firm for strategic management: economic value analysis. Cambridge University Press, 
2009.
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from another scale – the market – in the type of 
a dominant contract. If the market is dominated 
by classical and neoclassical contracts, a firm is 
ruled by a relational contract of employment. The 
key concept of the transactional theory of the firm 
is transaction costs. The concept of transaction 
costs was introduced by Coase who answered the 
question why firms exist in the economy (Coase 
1937). His response was that the exchange can be 
carried out both inside an organization and outside 
it through the market mechanism. Applying 
the traditional principle of optimization, firms 
internalize those exchanges, the implementation 
cost of which is lower in a firm.
Research approaches, rooted in Ronald 
Coase’s works, can be divided into two groups: 1) 
the theory of property rights (Jensen, Meckling, 
1976) and 2) the agency theory (Fama, 1980) 
and Williamson’s transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1985) which came into existence on 
its basis.
The theory of property rights emphasizes the 
rights in an organization established by contract. 
A firm is regarded as “a legal fiction” which is a 
nexus of contracts on the factors of production. 
According to the classical theory an agent who 
personifies a firm is an entrepreneur who is also a 
manager and a residual risk bearer. This approach 
is unable to explain a large modern corporation 
in which the control of a firm is in the hands of 
managers who are separate from shareholders. 
The situation changed with the formation of the 
agency theory which models a modern corporation 
as a structure that separates two key functions of 
an entrepreneur – management and risk-taking. 
Thus, the separation of ownership and control 
is an effective form of economic organization 
within the concept of “nexus of contracts” (Fama, 
1980).
Another branch of the transactional theory 
of the firm is Williamson’s transaction cost 
economics. The approach is interdisciplinary; it 
includes concepts from economics, law and the 
organization theory. Williamson often uses the 
term “hierarchy” describing a firm as a transaction 
control mechanism and emphasizing the 
relationship of subordination in an organization. 
In fact, an organization’s members do not appeal 
to the courts to resolve disputes but turn to a 
higher position in the hierarchy.
Williamson’s most important contribution 
to the transactional theory of the firm is 
probably his analysis of why and under what 
circumstances higher transaction costs can be 
expected, and namely whether it is the market 
mechanism or  the hierarchy. Williamson 
attributed managers’ declining attention to 
new activities, bureaucratic delays and other 
costs as well as the use of hierarchical forms of 
coordination to the management (bureaucracy) 
cost. A firm internalizes those transactions 
that can be managed more effectively within 
a hierarchy than through market exchanges, 
i.e. when market transaction costs are higher 
than bureaucratic costs of managing these 
transactions in a firm.
Thus, the hierarchy is a response to various 
types of market failures which can be explained 
by higher market transaction costs. For example, 
vertical integration is the result of market failure 
in the market of intermediate goods and labor 
market. In contrast, multidivisional structure 
can be considered as a substitute for institutional 
failure in the capital market and may contribute 
to an unrelated diversification.
According to Williamson (1985) the most 
common market failures are:
1. Bounded rationality and environmental 
uncertainty. As Simon claimed, “human 
behavior is extendedly rational, but 
only boundedly so” (Simon, 1955). The 
information processing capability of 
humans is limited and the complexity 
of our uncertain environment is so large 
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that it is impossible to fully optimize 
every decision. This places a limit in the 
possibility to write full contracts that 
could otherwise regulate all relations 
between independent actors. Complex 
transactions surrounded by greater 
uncertainty will tend to be internalized in 
a firm.
2. Opportunism, defined by Williamson as 
self-seeking behavior with guile. Some 
people may behave opportunistically if 
they have a chance, which is given by a 
contract with some gaps. Firms essentially 
emerge to overcome the situations in 
which the threat of opportunism is 
particularly large and damaging to at 
least one of the parties.
3. Asset specificity. Investing in asset that 
is very specific to an exchange with 
another party creates an acute problem of 
vulnerability for the weaker party forced 
to maintain the exchange relationship 
that, in the joint presence of opportunism 
and bounded rationality, makes contract-
based market transactions a highly 
inefficient alternative for the weaker 
party. Thus, asset specificity generates 
a hold-up problem for at least one of the 
parties, which may be taken hostages by 
the other party after the former invests in 
the highly specific assets.
Williamson stressed the presence of asset 
specificity as a critical determinant of transaction 
costs (Williamson 1985). In this context, the 
party that invests in highly specific assets would 
either limit the invested amount or suffer high 
costs of managing the contractual relationship 
in order to avoid possible abuse from the other 
party. In both cases managing the relationship 
through contractual market exchanges would 
incur higher costs than integrating both actors 
within a hierarchy, though some governance costs 
would obviously be suffered within the hierarchy 
as well. 
A comparative advantage of the transactional 
theory lies in the fact that it clearly revealed the 
nature of a firm as one of economic coordination 
types, and its tools demonstrated its efficiency 
in order to explain the realities of firms in the 
countries with developed market economies. 
At the same time, it should be noted that the 
implicit premise of the transactional theory is 
regarding a “norm” of the basic parameters of 
the institutional environment of the countries 
with developed market economies, especially 
the Anglo-Saxon. In this context the following 
question arises: to what extent is it an applicable 
tool for the analysis of business structures in the 
countries with various developed parameters of 
the institutional environment and other forms of 
business organization.
In this regard the phenomenon of business 
groups is of a particular importance as it is a major 
form of big business organization in developing 
countries. The need to explain the existence and 
sustainable development of this atypical form of 
a firm is a challenge to the transactional theory 
of the firm.
The business group is a set of formally 
independent firms operating in unrelated 
industries controlled by the owners who usually 
represent a clan or a family group. The main 
characteristics of business groups are deviations 
from a number of “right” and recognized Western 
institutions and business practices:
Firstly, in terms of modern strategic 
management it is assumed that a company should 
concentrate on its core competence; otherwise it 
loses its competitive advantages (Rumelt, 1982). 
Secondly, within the framework of good 
corporate governance it is assumed that separation 
of ownership and management is necessary. This 
is a prerequisite for the institutions developed to 
protect the interests of shareholders (especially 
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minority shareholders) and a company’s creditors 
(Johnson, 2000).
Thirdly, the norm of relations between 
business and government agencies in developed 
countries is lobbying – the pressure on the 
legislatures from organizations representing 
sectoral or regional interest groups. In developing 
countries the relationship between government 
and big business manifests itself in a personalized 
support of individual business structures at the 
level of administrative and judicial decisions, 
clearly described as corruption and crony 
capitalism by Western scholars.
Thus, business group is a typical object of study 
for economists, and that is why the sociologists 
became the pioneers of business groups research. 
One of the characteristics of a business groups 
is control over it by a group of people who are 
usually closely related by friendship, kinship or 
ethnic ties. This feature of a business group is of 
a great interest for economic sociology because 
the key concept of today’s economic sociology 
is “embeddedness” that reflects the process by 
which social relationships determine economic 
actions. According to this logic, business groups 
root in the system of exchange that promotes 
economic efficiency through inter-firm resource 
pooling, cooperation and coordinated adaptation. 
Even the forms of economic organization, that 
emerged in the countries with approximately the 
same level of development and have significant 
similarities in culture and social organization, 
can be very different which in its turn leads to 
different trajectories of economic growth.
In the framework of economic sociology 
there are two approaches to the research of 
national forms of business groups: cultural and 
institutional. Followers of the cultural approach 
(Fukuyama, Redding) consider an organization 
to be “a cultural artifact” manifesting deep values 
of society. One of the leaders of this approach is 
Francis Fukuyama. From his perspective, a form 
of economic organization depends on the level of 
trust between members of society.
Unlike the representatives of the cultural 
approach, focusing on a system of values, 
institutionalists (Powell, DiMaggio) focus on 
the institutional environment’s influence on the 
organizational structure. From their perspective, 
the organizational structure can evolve adapting 
to changing institutions. Thus, if the cultural 
approach is static, the institutional approach 
shows the dynamics.
However, with the laps of time economic 
approaches have been proposed to explain 
existence of business groups. There are two main 
approaches. Both are based on the transactional 
theory of the firm, but if the former is based upon 
the agency theory, the latter is the economy of 
transaction costs. The first approach implies the 
analysis of business groups from the standpoint 
of corporate governance in which business 
groups are regarded as “pyramids”. The concept 
of “a pyramid” was proposed by Johnson et al. 
(2007). It considers business groups to serve 
as the devices that let a not numerous group of 
owners control assets pushing other shareholders 
(the process is termed as “tunneling”). 
Another approach to business groups 
research is the concept of institutional voids 
proposed by Hanna (Hanna, 2007). Within this 
concept which adheres to Hanna, Paleru, Rivkin, 
Yafeh a business group is regarded as a sub-
optimal way of solving the problem of missing 
or improperly functioning institutions: property 
rights protection, the capital market, the market 
for managerial talent. Thus, from these authors’ 
perspective the best solution is direct borrowing of 
Western institutions, but during their absence or 
improper functioning a business group performs 
their function (i.e., a business group acts as a 
second-best decision, it internalizes certain types 
of transactions which would be carried out in the 
markets in a different institutional environment).
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It is important to mention that both concepts 
(those of “tunneling” and “institutional voids”) 
consider a business group a deviation from 
“normal” with the only difference that the latter 
approach regards it as a negative effect for national 
economies while the former one characterizes it 
as generally a positive one.
At the same time the proposed explanations 
cannot yet be considered an adequate response 
to the challenge posed to the transactional 
theory of the firm by the existence of business 
groups. Business groups are regarded as some 
kind of deviation that does not fit into the overall 
typology of firms, as proposed in the framework 
of the transactional theory.
From our point of view business groups 
and companies of the Western type should be 
considered as discrete institutional alternatives, 
the comparative advantages of each is determined 
by the institutional environment (Table 2).
The most important parameter of an 
institutional environment is the political market 
structure. Countries with developed market 
economies have relatively open political markets. 
In the countries with the markets of such a kind 
the political resource for business acts as club 
goods, access to which is provided through the 
system of political lobbying. However, access 
to political resources improves the framework 
conditions for the functioning of business or 
industry, but it does not become a private asset 
held by individual owners. In most countries there 
are closed political markets.1 Under the conditions 
of closed markets existence the political resource 
gets internalized, becomes the individuals’ 
property. Under these conditions an increasing 
range of the resources owners are involved in the 
establishment of firms. Along with the owners of 
business resources and financial capital they are 
the owners of a political resource.
The benefits that some firms derive from 
their exclusive relationship with the top officials 
have always attracted researchers’ considerable 
attention, primarily in the context of the analysis 
of economic growth in developing countries; even 
while different authors use different terminology 
and different theoretical concepts: “political 
connections”, “politically favored firms”, “crony 
economy”, “state capture”. 
Nevertheless, these works make it possible to:
1) quantify the benefits from the use of 
political resources which are firm;
2) identify the mechanisms of using political 
resources for competitive advantage;
3) determine which firms are most likely to 
get preferential treatment from the state.
Fisman in his pioneering research analyzes 
the impact of rumors about Indonesian president 
Table 2. Differences between a business group and a company
Business group Company
Development
Diversification into unrelated 
industries
Concentration on “core 
competencies” – some commodity 
group, or a processing chain
Ownership structure
Situational, deliberately confusing, 
indehiscent, characterized by 
the use of pyramidal structures 
to concentrate control in a small 
group of owners
A stable, disperse, significant role 
of institutional investors
Decision-making mechanism Fundamentally nontransparent Striving to fulfill the rules of “good 
corporate governance”
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Sukharto’s health during his last year in power 
on capitalization of companies with varied 
degree of political influence (Fisman, 2001). A 
highly centralized and stable political structure 
of Indonesia made it possible to form a credible 
index of political ties, while in the countries 
where political decisions are decentralized the 
identification of political connections is a daunting 
task. The analysis showed that the influence of 
rumors on the stock price of politically influential 
firms was significantly higher than their influence 
on the stock price of the companies with no or 
less political influence.
Fisman’s research was followed by a 
significant number of works on quantitative 
assessment of the impact of political influence on 
firms’ performance. Thus, Johnson and Mitton 
demonstrated how 1997-1998 Asian economic 
crisis reduced the expected value of government 
subsidies to the politically influential firms 
in Malaysia (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Data 
before and after the introduction of restrictions 
on capital movement in Malaysia were analyzed 
in the research. The authors showed that capital 
control can be viewed as an essential part 
of capitalism based on political connections 
(cronyism). Policy makers give informal 
guidance to the banks to approve loans for 
selected firms; this policy is relatively easier to 
implement provided a country is isolated from 
international capital flows. As a result, firms 
with political connections are more vulnerable to 
macroeconomic shocks as they reduce the ability 
of the government to grant them privileges and 
subsidies. Simon Johnson and Todd Mitton’s 
work is also based on a predefined list of 
politically influential firms with identification of 
policy makers related with specific firms.
Khwaja and Mian analyze the influence 
of political connections on the probability of 
obtaining bank loans in Pakistan (Khwaja and 
Mian, 2005). The authors classify a firm as 
“political” if its director participated in elections. 
The results show that political firms borrow 45 
per cent more and have 50 per cent higher default 
rates. It is important to note that such preferential 
treatment is received only from the state banks. 
In addition, the research shows a positive 
correlation between a firm’s affiliation with a 
business group and the probability of obtaining 
politically motivated lending; while the larger a 
business group is the greater the likelihood of 
getting loans is.
In all the researches mentioned above the 
authors firstly form a list of politically influential 
firms based on some factors (election campaigns 
funding, financing of specific politicians or 
parties, party membership of managers and 
company owners, the presence of top officials on 
the boards of directors, etc.) and then evaluate 
if politically influential firms get some specific 
benefits or privileges. It should be noted that the 
analysis of a political decision-making process 
in terms of the factors that make companies 
politically influential is complicated as collecting 
and interpretation of the data is impeded. For 
example, the firms which are actually less 
politically influential may be forced to fund a 
leading political party while more politically 
influential firms may be free from this obligation. 
Also, the possession of deputy immunity by a 
firm owner may be a strategy of defense from 
legal prosecution but not a way to get political 
influence.
An alternative strategy of the political 
connections research is based on the analysis 
of political decisions and the benefits that some 
firms derive from them. The research by Slinko 
et al. follows this strategy (Slinko, Zhuravskaya, 
Yakovlev, 2004). On the basis of the Russian 
legislation in 1992-2000 the authors created 
a measure of preferential treatment of firms 
from regional governments and evaluated the 
effects of preferential treatment on politically 
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influential firms. In comparison with the firms 
without political influence influential firms’ 
sales and employment grew faster; they invested 
more and received more profit. Investigating 
the issue of the firms that received preferential 
treatment, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya showed 
that a firm’s political influence is determined by 
a firm’s size and ownership structure: big firms 
(both in terms of sales and employment) and 
firms that are controlled by “federal oligarchs” 
have significantly higher likelihood of getting 
preferential treatment (Zhuravskaya, Yakovlev, 
2004). 
Research of political connections between 
government and business, as well as the benefits 
that some firms get from their special relationship 
with the authorities show that:
1. A political resource makes it possible 
for the firms to get a preferential access 
to other resources, especially capital, 
both to bank financing and to equity (the 
market values the firms which are more 
politically powerful). This effect can be 
measured quantitatively.
2. Formally independent firms in a highly 
diversified structure are more likely to get 
preferential treatment.
3. The mechanisms through which a firm 
benefits from the use of political resources 
are very diverse: tax breaks, investment 
credits, subsidies, loans guaranteed by 
regional budgets, official delays in tax 
payments, transfer of state property.
A political resource is not specific to the 
industry (although it is natural to assume that 
its value also varies from industry to industry: 
in industries with more stringent regulation it is 
greater). Whether a political resource becomes a 
source of a sustainable competitive advantage is 
determined by the institutional environment, and 
namely the type of political market inherent in a 
given country.
It is therefore necessary to characterize the 
notion of “the political market” highlighting its 
“extensive” and “narrow” interpretations. In 
a “broader” sense the political market is “the 
market of power”, the system of trading with 
a political resource. In a “narrow” sense it is a 
classical political market which appears within the 
institutional framework enshrining a democratic 
organization of a society’s political subsystem. 
It is the subject of analysis in the public choice 
theory the focus of which is a political choice in 
terms of direct and representative democracy. A 
classical political market should be considered in 
connection with a bureaucratic (administrative) 
market, typical for the Soviet economic system 
in particular as a discrete institutional alternative 
of a political market organization in a broader 
sense.
The hybrid of political and bureaucratic 
markets is typical for today’s developing and 
post-socialist countries. A “hybrid” nature of 
prevailing political and bureaucratic markets 
shows itself in the following:
1. Political, bureaucratic and economic 
exchanges really merge despite their formal 
separation.
2. Political transactions get 
“bureaucratized”, bureaucratic ones get 
“politicized”. “Bureaucratization” manifests 
itself in the fact that the actors’ competitiveness 
in politics and business is determined by their 
status in a political hierarchy. On the other hand, 
“bureaucrats” and “entrepreneurs” behave like 
“politicians”, they are eager to increase their 
political resource. Under these circumstances, 
both state officials and the most influential 
businessmen are interested in closing the access 
to a political resource in the framework of “a 
private club”. State officials do not only extract 
economic benefits but also consolidate their 
positions in a political hierarchy. Businessmen 
are getting interested in increasing investment 
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in extensive network of personal relationships 
with government officials.
The current structure of the political market 
determines how entrepreneurs get access to a 
political resource and returns from it.
In the countries where classical 
political markets entrenched, lobbying that 
is the pressure on the legislatures from the 
organizations representing sectoral or regional 
interest groups is the norm of relationships 
between business entities and the state. 
This means that entrepreneurs have access 
to the political resources through collective 
action. In this case it appears to them as a 
public good providing a favorable framework 
conditions for entrepreneurship but it does not 
become a source of a competitive advantage 
for individual business. When there are no 
relatively open political markets a political 
resource gets internalized within business 
In the countries where classical political markets entrenched, lobbying that is the 
pressure on the legislatures from the organizations representing sectoral or regional 
interest groups is the norm of relationships between business entities and the state. 
This means that entrepreneurs have access to the political resources through 
collective action. In this case it appears to them as a public good providing a 
favorable framework conditions for entrepreneurship but it does not become a 
source of a competitive advantage for individual business. When there are no 
relatively open political markets a political resource gets internalized within 
business groups, transactions are carried out through personalized communication 
(Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1. Internalization of a “political resource” in a business group 
 
Internalization of a political resource also means “washing out” of private 
property. According to the neo-institutional economic theory (Grossman-Hart’s 
model) signs of an asset owner is possession of the bundle of two rights: residual 
control (the right to take any decisions about use of the asset minus those that are 
explicitly defined by law and transferred to other parties in accordance with the 
contract) and residual income (income left after payments to all other parties). 
Fig. 1. Internalization of a “political resource” in a business group
Table 3. Comparative characteristics of bureaucratic and political markets
Political market Bureaucratic market
The subjects of 
the market
Voters, politicians and pressure groups
Various interest groups within a single 
formal administrative hierarchy
Type of 
institutional 
arrangements
Mostly legal, between subjects, which serve 
as property carriers (principal - the voter, 
and his agents’ policy)
As a rule, illegal and status (between 
disparate entities)
The model 
of economic 
behavior
The more competitive and coordinated the 
market is, the more efficient the distribution 
of property rights is. This leads to the 
establishment of hard budget constraints.
There is a continuing erosion of a formal 
state ownership by illegal assignment of 
property rights by “interest groups”. Soft 
budget constraints get fixed, the degree of 
softness is different for different interest 
gr ps, the higher the st tus is the softer
budget constraints are.
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groups, transactions are carried out through 
personalized communication (Fig. 1).
Internalization of a political resource 
also means “washing out” of private property. 
According to the neo-institutional economic 
theory (Grossman-Hart’s model) signs of an 
asset owner is possession of the bundle of two 
rights: residual control (the right to take any 
decisions about use of the asset minus those that 
are explicitly defined by law and transferred to 
other parties in accordance with the contract) and 
residual income (income left after payments to all 
other parties). State officials act as real property 
rights owners because they have residual control 
and income right.
Our analysis makes it possible to outline 
the theoretical approaches and respond to the 
challenge that the transactional theory of the firm 
faces due to existence of business groups. From our 
point of view, a full response to this challenge is in 
expanding the subject of the transactional theory 
research that implies the necessity to analyze the 
owners of an internalized political resource. Under 
this approach large business owners are either 
financial capital owners or internalized political 
resource owners. This depends on the parameters 
of an institutional environment. In the first case 
a leading organizational form is a company that 
usually exists in the form of a public corporation, 
in the second case it is a business group.
1. Interesting approaches to this problem can be found in the concept of limited access order (North, D.C., Wallis, J.J., 
Weingast, B.R. Violence and social order: a conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history. Cambridge 
University Press, 2009.).
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Бизнес-группа:  
вызов для трансакционной теории фирмы
С.Н. Левин, Д.В. Кислицын
Кемеровский государственный университет 
Россия 650043, Кемерово, ул. Красная, 6
В статье анализируется вызов, с которым столкнулась трансакционная теория фирмы в 
связи с доминированием в экономиках развивающихся стран такой организационной формы, 
как бизнес-групп. В качестве ответа на данный вызов предложено расширение предмета 
исследования трансакционной теории фирмы за счет включения в анализ собственников 
интернализированного политического ресурса. В рамках такого подхода в зависимости от 
параметров институциональной среды в качестве собственников выступают либо владельцы 
финансового капитала, либо владельцы интернализированного политического ресурса. В первом 
случае мы получаем компанию, как правило, существующую в виде открытой корпорации, а во 
втором – бизнес-группу.
Ключевые слова: трансакционная теория фирмы, бизнес-группы, политический рынок, 
интернализация политического ресурса.
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